

CHAPTER XV

STATESMANSHIP AND STRATEGY*

Bonaparte's Plan of Campaign — His Relation to Moreau — The Reserve Army — The Movements of Moreau — The Austrians Defeated — Further Advance of Moreau — Bonaparte with the Army — The Italian Campaign — Position of the Austrians — The St. Bernard — Passage of the Alps — Military Problems — Grand Strategy — Bonaparte's Preparation.

BY an article of the new French constitution the First Consul might not be also commander-in-chief of the forces; but, as he said to Miot de Melito, nothing forbade him to be present with the army. Nevertheless, his military greatness was now for the first time to display its stupendous proportions. Hitherto, superb as had been his achievements, they had been won as a subordinate carrying out one part of a large plan, and securing prominence for his own ideas only by disregarding those of nominal superiors. Now he had charge of a great war in its entirety. There was but one obstacle — Moreau's ability and jealousy. With the

1 The important military authorities are Napoleon's own letters and bulletins. Campaigne de 1800, Alison's Castlereagh, Woronzow's Archives, Dumolin: and Bailleu: Essays in the History of the Napoleonic Wars, Pre*cis d'histoire militaire. Yorck: Historische Zeitschrift, vols. 77 and 81; Cugnac: Campagne de l'arme*e von Wartenburg: Napoleon als Feldherr. Jomini: Histoire critiqueet militaire des guerres de la de reserve en 1800, La campagne de Marengo; Gachot: La deuxieme campagne d'Italie; Neipperg: Revolution, 1792-1803. Dodge: Aperçu sur la bataille de Marengo; Napoleon. Clausewitz: Werke. Hiiffer: Quellen zur Geschichte des 19ten Jahrhunderts, Thugut's letters, Marbot's memoirs, Thibault's Journal of the Blockade of Genoa, Valmy: Histoire de la Moreau.